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Change We Can Fight Over: The Relationship between Arable 
Land Supply and Substate Conflict 
Nathan Black 
Introduction 
After decades of debate, most natural scientists have now acknowledged that the earth’s 
temperature is rising. These scientists also predict that the environmental consequences of global 
climate change over the next 20-100 years will be significant.[1] This gradual realization of the 
existence and environmental impact of global warming has spurred a parallel discussion among 
national security academics and policymakers about the security consequences of climate 
change. Roughly speaking, there are two camps in this discussion—one that ominously predicts 
the potential for global warming to spark violent resource-related conflicts all over the world,[2] 
and one that views the link between climate change and conflict as ambiguous and unproven.[3]  
This debate between alarmists and skeptics (of the security consequences of climate change, not 
of climate change itself) has clear consequences for great power security policy in the coming 
decades. In recent years the great powers have begun to take slow steps toward the prevention 
and mitigation of future climate change, but the stark reality is that global warming is already 
upon us. Thus, policymakers need to know—both now and in the coming decades—whether 
climate change can be expected to touch off the resource conflicts that some analysts have 
predicted. If the answer is in the affirmative, then considerably more resources need to be put 
against the prevention and mitigation of climate change-related violence, and not simply against 
the prevention and mitigation of global warming itself. 
But the resolution of this debate has proved difficult, because the alleged link between climate 
change and violent conflict is not direct—the weather does not reach down and start wars. 
Rather, what is being proposed by the alarmist camp is a multi-step process. First, global 
warming will cause environmental degradation in many parts of the world, such as Africa and 
Latin America, that are already prone to conflict.[4] Second, environmental degradation will 
result in natural resource scarcities. Third, these resource scarcities will supposedly lead to 
armed violence between competing non-state actors and/or states. Each of the steps in this 
process must be validated conclusively in order for us to predict that climate change will increase 
the frequency of armed conflict in the future. Thus, recent empirical work that has shown a direct 
statistical association between changes in rainfall or temperature and conflict gives us little sense 
of the mechanisms by which these environmental changes are actually associated with conflict, 





This article attempts to move this important climate change and conflict debate forward by 
focusing in on one step—the final one—in the alleged climate change to conflict process. The 
article explores the relationship between supply-side changes to a single but critical natural 
resource, arable land, and the likelihood of both civil war and substate armed conflict in general 
between 1965 and 1999. In so doing, the article speculates on the effect of one likely outcome of 
climate change, rather than attempting to directly estimate the future effect of climate change 
itself (see Figure 1). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicted in 2007 that 
“agricultural land” would decrease as a result of global warming, particularly in Africa and Latin 
America.[6] Logically, then, if reductions in agricultural land supply—here measured as  
“arable land” supply (on definitions, see below)—and substate conflict have been linked in the 
past, then climate change, to the extent that it exacerbates such supply reductions, will probably 




Figure 1. Possible causal pathway from climate change to substate conflict, with the link to be explored 
in this article represented by the dotted line. 
Beyond its salience to the climate change debate, this article’s focus on the land-conflict link 
specifically represents a needed addition to the existing academic literature. Prior empirical work 
on renewable resources and substate conflict has frequently attempted to measure the link 
between land scarcity and conflict, but has not done so using the most intuitive and theoretically 
consistent explanatory variable. As a result, the findings obtained by these studies are 
inconclusive and often contradictory. 
This article, in contrast, finds an unambiguous and robust relationship between arable land 
supply and substate conflict. Using a more intuitive and theoretically consistent specification of 
the explanatory variable—measuring changes in arable land supply over time, rather than 
capturing the resource endowment at a single time-point—this article shows that changes to that 
supply are, in fact, significantly associated with the likelihood of civil war. These results 
therefore suggest that, at least with respect to one key natural resource, the final alleged link in 
the causal chain from climate change to conflict is valid, and that arable land supply changes 
arising from future climate change should be of concern to security policymakers. To achieve a 
fuller understanding of the mechanisms underlying this robust statistical association, this article 
then proposes a preliminary theory of the way in which arable land scarcity causes substate 




the probability of war much more than negative changes increase the probability, leading to a 
view of arable land supply change as a direct brake on conflict and only an indirect gas pedal. In 
the end, then, this article comes down in between the alarmists and the skeptics in the climate 
change and conflict debate. The article predicts that climate change, to the extent that it 
diminishes arable land supplies, will marginally increase the likelihood of civil war—but the 
article emphasizes that we should only expect to see such resource wars where the difficult task 
of popular mobilization by insurgent or counterinsurgent elites is successfully completed. 
The next section reviews the past empirical tests of the relationship between land and substate 
conflict, and identifies an important specification of the explanatory variable that has not yet 
been tried. In the third section, the consistency of this new specification with major theories of 
scarcity and conflict is demonstrated. The fourth section details the article’s own empirical test, 
which aims to overcome the shortcomings of the prior literature. The large-N results, presented 
next, show strong and robust support for an arable land supply-civil war relationship, and suggest 
the preliminary theory that is then detailed. The case of Darfur is then used to illustrate this 
theory. The concluding section considers the implications of these results for the climate change-
conflict debate and identifies directions for future research. 
Past Empirical Tests of the Land-Conflict Relationship 
Table 1 summarizes the specifications and findings of seven major tests of the relationship 
between land and substate conflict, with publication dates spanning from 1998 to 2008. These 
seven articles do not examine land in particular but rather the general link between renewable 
resources and substate conflict; the table shows the tests and results that pertain specifically to 
land. In this section the indeterminacy of these tests is shown, and it is postulated that the 
indeterminacy arises from a counter-intuitively specified explanatory variable. 
The large-N literature on land and substate conflict is widely acknowledged to have begun with 
the competing findings of Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) and Esty et al. (1999). Hauge and 
Ellingsen claim to find direct associations between the extent of soil degradation in a state and 
the likelihood of both civil war and lower-grade substate conflict in that state, while Esty et al. 
find no such direct relationship. Instead, the closest Esty et al. come is correlating “soil 
degradation” (severity times “rate”) with infant mortality, which is in turn correlated with the 
likelihood of “state failure.” (State failure encompasses civil war but includes other phenomena, 
including “adverse or disruptive regime transitions,” “genocides” and “politicides.”[9]) 
The empirical debate over whether a land-conflict link exists, and over whether that link is direct 
or mediated by socioeconomic or institutional factors, has continued intermittently for the 
subsequent decade with mixed and often contradictory results. For example, Hendrix and Glaser 
(2007) agree with Esty et al. that land degradation and armed conflict onset are not directly 
related, but in the same year Raleigh and Urdal (2007) found a positive association between soil 
degradation and armed conflict. Most recently, Theisen (2008) attempted a resolution of this 




discovered that contrary to Hauge and Ellingsen’s original claim, soil degradation severity and 
civil war onset were not significantly related. Furthermore, the relationship between soil 
degradation severity and armed conflict in general was shown to be rather weak. 
Table 1: Summary of Previous Tests of the Land-Substate Conflict Relationship 
Article Dependent Variable Proxy for Land Finding 
Hauge and 
Ellingsen 1998 
Onset of civil war 
(Correlates of War 
definition), 1980-1992 
and onset of armed 
conflict (PRIO 
definition), 1989-1992 
Soil degradation severity 
(ordinal), as measured 
by the UNEP in 1990 
“Moderate” and “high” soil 
degradation positively and 
significantly associated with 
both civil war onset and armed 
conflict onset 
Esty et al. 1999 State failure, 1957-
1996; infant mortality 
as an intervening 
dependent variable 
Ordinal soil degradation 
severity (UNEP) and 
ordinal estimates of rate 
of degradation over past 
5-10 years; “land 
burden” (farmers per 
unit cropland multiplied 
by ratio of farmers to 
total workers) and rate 
of change in land burden 
No significant relationship 
between either proxy and state 
failure; soil degradation 
(severity times rate) is 
positively associated with infant 
mortality, which in turn is 
associated with state failure 
De Soysa 2002 Onset of armed conflict 
(PRIO definition), 
1989-2000 
Arable land as 
percentage of total land 
at a single time-point 
Negative and significant 
relationship between arable land 
percentage and armed conflict 
onset 
Urdal 2005 Onset of armed conflict 
(PRIO definition), 
1950-2000 
None, but considers 
“population density” 
with respect to cropland 
(population divided by 
cropland area in 
country); cropland 
measured at a single 
time-point 
No significant relationship 
between an interaction term 
(population growth multiplied 
by “population density”) and 
conflict; weakly significant 
negative association between 








Percentage of land 
degraded as measured 
by the FAO at a single 
time-point 
No significant coefficients on 




Onset of armed conflict 
(PRIO definition), 
1990-2004 
Soil degradation severity 
(ordinal), as measured 
by the UNEP in 1990 
“Medium” and “high” soil 
degradation positively and 
significantly associated with 
armed conflict onset 
Theisen 2008 Onset of civil war 
(Correlates of War 
definition), 1980-1992 
and onset of armed 
conflict (PRIO 
definition), 1989-1992 
Soil degradation severity 
(ordinal), as measured 
by the UNEP in 1990 
“High” soil degradation 
positively and significantly 
associated with armed conflict 
onset but “medium” soil 
degradation only weakly 
associated; soil degradation and 





The balance of these empirical works might suggest, at first glance, a null hypothesis that there is 
no consistent relationship between land supply and substate conflict. This, in turn, would suggest 
that in the vast universe of worries on the minds of great power security policymakers, the 
impact of climate change on states’ land supplies should perhaps be a small concern. However, 
this conclusion would be premature, because the land-conflict relationship has not yet been 
tested with a more intuitive specification of land supply. 
Looking down the “proxy for land” column of Table 1, it quickly becomes evident that almost 
every land-related explanatory variable is static—it measures the quantity of land or the extent of 
land degradation at a single point in time. For instance, the frequently-used ordinal indicator of 
“soil degradation” severity was published by the United Nations Environmental Program in 
1991, and considers only soil degradation as assessed in 1990.[10] The measures of Hendrix and 
Glaser (2007) are similarly time-invariant; that used by de Soysa (2002) appears to be as well. 
Some of the measures of land used by Esty et al. (1999) can be considered measures of the 
change in land supply over time, but even these are tenuous. (The “rate” of soil degradation is an 
ordinal estimate of the one-time change from 1980-1990 or 1985-1990; the rate of change in 
“land burden” is mainly a measure of the change in demand for land, not in the change to supply 
of land.) As for Urdal (2005), although he does measure the extent to which a state’s 
population’s demand for land changes over time, he does so while measuring a state’s cropland 
area at a single time-point.[11] (In other words, population varies over time in his model, but not 
land supply.) 
These static specifications of the explanatory variable, land supply, do not seem directly related 
to the postulated climate change to conflict process that is of substantive interest in this article. In 
that process, environmental degradation is alleged to decrease a given state’s agricultural land 
supply, leading to violent resource conflicts. But decreases (or increases) in a state’s land supply 
are not measured in these previous empirical works; only a snapshot of a state’s land at one time-
point is known. From these works we might be able to conclude that countries with less or lower-
quality land than other countries are more likely to experience substate conflict—although the 
indeterminacy of the results shown above do not fully support that conclusion—but we cannot 
conclude that countries which experience a negative shock to their land supply are more likely to 
experience conflict. 
Hence, given the recent context of the climate change and conflict debate, there is a need for a 
study which examines the relationship between the change in a state’s arable land supply and the 
likelihood of both civil war and violent substate conflict in general. This article fills that gap, 
using data on arable land supply collected at the state level by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (more on these data below). Measures of hectares of arable land are available in 
time-series for almost every country in the world from 1961 to 1999.[12] Thus we have rich data 





The Importance of a Dynamic Explanatory Variable to Scarcity and Conflict Theories 
In addition to fitting more intuitively in the “climate change to conflict” debate that this article 
engages, a dynamic specification of the arable land supply explanatory variable is also more 
consistent with major theoretical perspectives on scarcity and substate conflict. Several of these 
theoretical perspectives are discussed in this section, and the importance of a dynamic 
independent variable to each of these perspectives is demonstrated. It should be noted that these 
theoretical perspectives are not mutually exclusive and are often combined in empirical studies; 
likewise, they will be combined in the preliminary theory of arable land scarcity and conflict that 
is proposed below. 
Homer-Dixon and “Supply-Induced Scarcity” 
The major contemporary theory of natural resource scarcity and substate conflict comes from 
Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999). Homer-Dixon’s basic argument is that “environmental scarcity” 
is causally linked to substate conflict through two mechanisms. The first mechanism, “resource 
capture,” “occurs when powerful elites use their power in order to grab resources they anticipate 
will become scarce in the near future.”[13] This results in a spiral of hostilities between elites 
and masses, in which the masses are aggrieved by the even greater scarcities and the elites 
weaken the political institutions that might otherwise alleviate the tensions. The second 
mechanism, “ecological marginalization,” “takes place when population groups faced with 
scarcity of resources migrate into an area with a fragile ecosystem, in turn creating greater 
scarcities in that area and deprivation conflicts between natives and newcomers.”[14] The 
importance of a dynamic explanatory variable is evident from this short exposition of Homer-
Dixon’s theory. It is the changes over-time to the natural resources in this theory, and elite and 
mass responses to those changes, that set in motion the mechanisms that lead to conflict. Two 
additional potential mechanisms by which environmental scarcity might lead to substate conflict 
are described by Kahl (2006): “state failure,” by which scarcities erode the state, and “state 
exploitation,” by which elites foment scarcity-based conflicts that benefit them politically. 
Again, a time-variant explanatory variable would be required to test the presence of either of 
these mechanisms. 
Homer-Dixon also introduces a useful typology of “environmental scarcity” that helps us state 
more precisely what the explanatory variable in this study consists of. There are three types of 
environmental scarcity, he writes. “Supply-induced scarcity” is scarcity brought on by shrinking 
resource pools. “Demand-induced scarcity” results from more people wanting to draw from a 
given resource pool; population pressure is a common proxy for demand-induced scarcity. 
“Structure-induced scarcity” results from an uneven distribution of a resource pool; in this sense, 
even a resource-rich country such as the United States could suffer from environmental 
scarcity.[15] In the empirical works discussed above, some scholars focus on supply-induced 
scarcity,[16] some focus on demand-induced scarcity,[17] and some focus on a combination of 
the two.[18] Because my interest is ultimately in the impact of climate change on the likelihood 




warming will not directly affect the demand for arable land or the distribution of arable land; it 
will impact its supply, and thus it is changes to arable land supply that are of greatest interest in 
this article. 
Relative Deprivation 
Another, older theory which postulates a relationship between scarcity and substate conflict—
and which, incidentally, is not confined to the scarcity of environmental assets—is the Relative 
Deprivation (RD) theory articulated by Gurr (1968a, 1968b, 1970). Gurr defines RD as “actors’ 
perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations … and their value capabilities,”[19] 
where “value expectations” are “the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they 
are rightfully entitled” and “value capabilities” are “the goods and conditions they think they are 
capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them.”[20] The key 
insight here is that absolute well-being is not as great an explanatory factor as is an individual’s 
assessment of his or her relative well-being.[21] The relationship Gurr posits between RD and 
substate violence is direct and straightforward: “The more severe is relative deprivation, the 
greater the likelihood and intensity of civil violence.”[22]  
RD was and is an important theoretical contribution to the civil war literature, yet in general only 
one particular variety of RD has been tested empirically. Most RD research has considered as the 
explanatory variable the differences in well-being between social groups at a given point in time. 
This is intergroup RD, and thus would be concerned with structure-induced scarcity within 
Homer-Dixon’s framework. For example, Morrison and Stevenson (1972) look at the difference 
between “elite” secondary school enrollment and “mass” secondary school enrollment as one of 
their explanatory variables in their study of African “communal instability.” Intergroup RD 
research can only occasionally be found in modern political science, and now as then, as an 
explanatory variable it has only limited empirical support.[243] 
But RD need not be intergroup, as Gurr and contemporary theorists were quick to point out. Gurr 
writes, “An individual’s point of reference may be his own past condition, an abstract ideal, or 
the standards articulated by a leader as well as a ‘reference group.’”[24] Thus RD can be 
temporal as well—the worsening of a person’s or a group’s condition over time, rather than 
relative to other people or groups, could be a cause of armed violence. Several other social 
scientists have invoked some form of “temporal RD,” as I will call it, in their own theories of 
civil conflict. James Davies (1962), in his well-known “theory of revolution,” adapts an insight 
from Alexis de Tocqueville to hypothesize that “revolutions are most likely to occur when a 
prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of 
sharp reversal.”[25] His (and Tocqueville’s) most compelling example is the French Revolution, 
which followed centuries of abject poverty, one century of relative improvement, and a brief 
period of relative decline (in that order). 
Clearly temporal RD, as a theoretical mechanism linking scarcity and conflict, also requires a 




point is not sufficient to determine whether the temporal RD mechanism is at work. To know 
whether individuals or groups are going to feel deprived of a resource, we must also know what 
their baseline endowment of the resource was, because this baseline endowment will determine, 
in large part, the “value expectations” that Gurr discusses. 
(Note: Although the focus of this article is on changes in arable land supply over time—hence 
examining temporal RD to the exclusion of intergroup RD—intergroup RD is also considered by 
way of inclusion of the “land GINI” control variable, discussed in more detail below.) 
The Grievance School of Civil War 
The final theoretical perspective on scarcity and substate conflict comes from a more recent and 
well-known source than the previous two perspectives discussed, although it incorporates 
elements of the previous two perspectives as discussed below. That source is the “grievance” 
school of the civil war literature, which has risen in opposition to the “greed” school (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004).[26] (However, as discussed below, a causal story told from the “greed” school’s 
perspective might be observationally equivalent in my test.) The basic theory of civil war 
proposed by the grievance school is that internal wars are most likely to break out when 
everyday people in a given country have something to be angry or fearful about. Political elites 
need rank-and-file members in order for their insurgency or counterinsurgency campaigns to 
even get off the ground, so they attempt to recruit ordinary people by exploiting an existing 
grievance. For instance, insurgent elites in El Salvador won over many fighters and passive 
supporters with their message that the long-standing gross misdistribution of land within the state 
was outrageous, not inevitable (Wood 2003). But a similar mobilization attempt in the Santa 
Cruz region of Bolivia, where land was abundant, failed—one observer remarked, “What was 
Ché going to offer these peasants, still more land they could not use?”[27] According to 
grievance theory, then, the greater the level of mass grievance in a state, the greater the 
likelihood that elites will mobilize that grievance into a successful recruitment campaign and the 
greater the subsequent likelihood of major armed substate conflict. 
The conditions of supply-induced scarcity and temporal relative deprivation, described above, 
seem to be two of many potential forms of mass grievance. (Intergroup relative deprivation, 
demand-induced scarcity, and structure-induced scarcity are others.) With these examples in 
mind, it is difficult—though not impossible—to imagine measuring mass grievance with a static 
explanatory variable, such as a state’s arable land endowment or GDP per capita at a particular 
time-point. People might be aggrieved by their absolute poverty, hunger, or lack of livelihood, 
but they seem more likely to be aggrieved by their negative assessment of their relative well-
being over time. The use of a dynamic explanatory variable, such as arable land growth or GDP 
growth, thus seems more consistent with the grievance school of civil war. 
All three theoretical perspectives on scarcity and substate conflict, then, suggest that the 
explanatory variable of interest should capture change over time, rather than an absolute resource 
endowment at a single time-point. The use of a dynamic explanatory variable will thus constitute 




the grievance school as it applies to arable land scarcity—arable land scarcity should increase 
pools of grievance within states, which should make mass recruitment into insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies easier and, therefore, civil wars more likely—against the null hypothesis 
that there is no such causal link between arable land scarcity and substate conflict. 
Specification of Empirical Test 
The unit of analysis in this study is the country-year. This article used the Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) civil war dataset as the baseline for data collection.[28] These data cover 161 countries 
between 1945 and 1999. Because data on the independent variables are generally only available 
from 1965 onward, the baseline dataset was censored to run from 1965 to 1999. This puts the 
total number of country-year observations at 4,872. The dependent variable, “onset,” is drawn 
from the Fearon and Laitin baseline dataset. It takes a value of 1 if a civil war started in a given 
country-year, and 0 otherwise. Of the 4,872 observations, 81 (1.7 percent) are onset country-
years. As a robustness check, this article also considers the onset of armed conflict, as defined by 
the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), in the same country-years.[29] Since the 
annual observational bar for “armed conflict” (25 battle-related deaths) is lower than the bar for 
civil war (1,000 battle-related deaths), there are more positive observations—172, or 3.5 percent. 
The primary independent variable is “delta-land”: the three-year percentage change, from t-4 to 
t-1, of hectares of arable land in the country.[30]The three-year change is meant to capture a 
medium-term increase or decline in a state’s arable land endowment—one sufficiently sustained 
that the population of that state would notice (but not over such a long period that the population 
would forget its baseline resource endowment).[31] This variable is calculated from the absolute 
hectares of arable land in each country-year. These data are drawn from the World Development 
Indicators,[32] which in turn relies on the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for 
reporting. The FAO collects its arable land data from a mix of country’s self-reports and expert 
estimates. The mean value of delta-land is +2 percent, with a standard deviation of 8.5 percent. 
According to the FAO, arable land is defined as “land under temporary crops, … temporary 
meadows for mowing or pasture, land under market and kitchen gardens and land temporarily 
fallow (less than five years).” It is contrasted with “permanent cropland,” which consists of land 
for crops that are not replanted annually such as “cocoa, coffee and rubber,” and “permanent 
pasture,” which is “land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous forage crops, 
either cultivated or growing wild (wild prairie or grazing land).”[33] Between these three 
measures, I believe arable land is the best to use for this study. “Permanent cropland” seems less 
likely to be relevant to the causes of substate conflict, because the resources that grow on such 
land seem less vital. “Permanent pasture” could be relevant but the data seem less reliable. First, 
the FAO warns of overlap between this category and the “forests and woodland” category, which 
was discontinued in 1995. Secondly, an examination of the FAO data indicates that the “arable 
land” indicator is more likely to change from country-year to country-year and is less likely to be 
self-reported. Overall, arable land seems to be the most reliable and the most intuitive measure of 




The following control variables were used: 
Arable land per capita (the static value). This would be a more traditional primary independent 
variable in a test of renewable resources and conflict, so it is worth seeing its association with 
conflict as well. Data are from the World Development Indicators. 
Change in the state’s population from t-4 to t-1. This is the proxy for demand for arable land; 
since we want to know the specific association between arable land supply change and war, we 
need to control for the other types of scarcity defined by Homer-Dixon. This variable is 
transformed from raw population data in the baseline Fearon/Laitin dataset. 
Land GINI coefficient (data are not sufficiently available for a delta variable). This measures 
proxies’ structure-induced scarcity. Data are drawn from the replication dataset for Collier and 
Hoeffler’s (2004) article, and thus are aggregated at five-year intervals.[34] 
Change in the constant-dollar value of agricultural imports from t-4 to t-1. Several critics of the 
resource-conflict literature have pointed out that countries facing scarcities can often import their 
way out of the problem.[35] This article controls for that phenomenon with this variable, using 
import data from the FAO.[36] 
The state’s POLITY 2 score. This variable, which measures the democracy level of a state, is 
meant to capture the overall institutional health of the country—since such health may mediate 
the relationship between environment and conflict. Data are available for almost every country-
year in the Fearon/Laitin dataset. 
A dummy variable for whether the country-year is in Sub-Saharan Africa. Much of the 
environmental security literature draws on this region for its case evidence, so it would be useful 
to see if controlling for the region eliminates delta-land’s marginal effect. Data are available in 
the Fearon/Laitin dataset. 
The level of secondary male education in the state. Homer-Dixon identifies a loss of “ingenuity” 
as one of the intermediate mechanisms between environmental scarcity and conflict;[37] thus it 
makes sense to control for a broad measure of human capital. The data for this variable are 
drawn from Collier and Hoeffler and are aggregated at five-year intervals. 
Nine “usual suspect” control variables that fit my test into the overall theoretical framework of 
civil war: GDP per capita—both a static and a “delta” measure from t-4 to t-1 (Fearon and 
Laitin), ethnic fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin), religious fractionalization (Fearon and 
Laitin), percent mountainous terrain (Fearon and Laitin), a political instability dummy (Fearon 
and Laitin), a “Cold War” dummy (1 if the country-year is pre-1990), peace years (Collier and 
Hoeffler, with some extrapolation from the Correlates of War list of intrastate wars[38]), and 





All empirical tests were conducted with robust standard errors clustered by country.[39] Table 2 
shows the results from the basic civil war onset model. For comparison purposes, Model I 
follows Hendrix and Glaser (2007) and uses the percentage of degraded land as the explanatory 
variable. The coefficient is in the expected direction but is nowhere close to statistical 
significance. As in the empirical tests reviewed above, the land degradation data are time-
invariant by country—they were downloaded from the FAO’s “Terrastat” website and last 
updated in 2003.[40] These results simply show, then, that using a static explanatory variable in 
a land-conflict test yields inconclusive findings. 
On the other hand, the coefficients on delta-land in Models II-VI are consistently negative and 
statistically significant.[41] In other words, high positive growth in the quantity of arable land is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of civil war onset. Models II-IV were run with the 
entire sample. I successively dropped control variables to get a higher N, and the substantive 
statistical effect remains constant across these models. Models V-VI are a robustness check; 
instead of considering every country-year for which data are available, I censored the model to 
those country-years in which agricultural value added comprises 25 percent or more of the 
country’s GDP.[42] Despite the substantial drop in N in this “agriculturally dependent” sub-
sample, the coefficient on delta-land remains negative and significant. 
Since raw logit coefficients can be difficult to interpret, Table 3 shows the results of a simulation 
run using the “Clarify” software built by Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King 
(version 2.0). Model II was simulated, setting all of the control variables to their medians and 
then varying the value of delta-land. There is an unambiguous fall in the probability of civil war 
as delta-land increases. Further simulations (not shown) reveal that among all the time-variant 
continuous variables, the average marginal effect of one- or two-standard-deviation changes 
from the median is second-greatest for delta-land (second only to GDP per capita). Thus, a 
strong, robust relationship between arable land supply and civil war onset has been identified. 
The previous empirical literature, which found inconsistent results on this front, was simply 
looking at a less intuitive specification of the explanatory variable. 
When armed conflict onset, rather than civil war onset, is used as the dependent variable, the 
relationship between delta-land and conflict is in the expected direction but is generally non- 
significant (though the p-value is as low as 0.156 when land GINI and male secondary education 
are dropped). Thus, in direct contradiction to Theisen’s (2008) findings, the relationship between 
land supply and conflict is most clearly manifested at the level of civil war. This means the 
security implications of climate change may be even grimmer than the literature has supposed.  
To the extent that changes in arable land supply cause conflict—not knowable only from 
correlations, of course—they seem to cause wars not skirmishes. So further exploration of the 




Table 2: Logit Models (DV = Civil War Onset) 
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N 2644 2644 2793 4195 751 1321 
Pseudo R2 0.1176 0.1376 0.1215 0.0875 0.1464 0.0873 
Two-tailed tests; absolute values of Z statistics in parentheses. 




Table 3: Results of simulated model with global sample, holding other variables at 
medians. 
Simulated Value of Delta-
Land 
Simulated Probability of Civil War 90% Confidence Interval 
Median among observations 
used in model (+0.2%) 
Baseline: 2.2% 1.2% – 3.5% 
–1 standard deviation (–8.3%) 4.7% 2.2% – 8.3% 
–2 standard deviations (–16.9%) 10.0% 3.8% – 19.3% 
+1 standard deviation (+8.7%) 1.0% 0.5% – 1.7% 
+2 standard deviations 
(+17.3%) 
0.5% 0.2% – 1.0% 
Explanatory-Variable Sample Partitions 
A fruitful follow-up question is: Does the association of delta-land with civil war onset vary 
according to whether delta-land is negative or positive? Interestingly, it does, as shown in Table 
4. Models run with only positive values of delta-land obtain the expected negative and 
significant coefficients on the explanatory variable.[43] Yet models run with only negative or 
zero values of delta-land do not obtain significant coefficients on the explanatory variable. These 
findings suggest that the results in the non-partitioned sample are driven by positive values of 
delta-land, and that negative and zero values of delta-land have no consistent relationship with 
the probability of civil war onset.[44] 
Table 4: Logit Models (DV = Civil War Onset) 










































































































(1.01) 8 (.50) 




















































































































































































N 1388 1256 2365 1830 458 293 
Pseudo R2 0.2414 0.2067 0.1252 0.1363 0.2244 0.3860 
 Two-tailed tests; absolute values of Z statistics in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
These results might be explained by the preliminary theory of arable land scarcity and conflict 
proposed in Figure 2. It shows positive growth in arable land as a direct “brake” on conflict, 
while supply shrinkage is only an indirect gas pedal. In other words, high arable land growth 
makes civil war unlikely because the opportunity for a pool of temporal relative deprivation-
fueled grievance to form is very limited. If this land-growth brake is removed, temporal relative 
deprivation-fueled grievance arises,[45] which is sometimes mobilized by elites—whether 




positive values of delta-land would have a direct dampening effect on civil war likelihood, but 
negative or zero values would not have a direct upward effect on that probability because they 
would not be a sufficient condition for war.[46] This postulation of arable land scarcity as a 
necessary but insufficient condition for war along this causal pathway is similar to Kahl’s (2006) 
view of his much broader environmental variable, “demographic and environmental stress.”[47] 
The significant control variables in the negative/zero models in Table 4—primarily land GINI, 
GDP per capita and ethnic fractionalization—perhaps specify conditions under which these elites 
are more likely to be successful at this mobilization of grievances. The ethnic fractionalization 
coefficients are certainly consistent with Kahl’s “state exploitation” mechanism (see above).  
Surprisingly, though, it appears that low structure-induced scarcity makes mobilization more 
likely to be successful, which is not consistent with either Kahl’s or Homer-Dixon’s theories. 
The exact nature of the conditions under which elite mobilization of arable land supply-related 
grievances is successful or unsuccessful clearly needs further exploration. 
Overall, the large-N analysis has shown two facts about the association between changes in 
arable land supply and the probability of civil war. First, an association exists; the null 
hypothesis, which has received support from the extant empirical literature, is rejected when 
delta-land is used as the explanatory variable. Second, changes in arable land supply appear to 
act as a direct brake on conflict but only as an indirect gas pedal, suggesting the preliminary 
theory portrayed in Figure 2. 
The problem with this story is that this article is trying to illustrate a micro-level theory with 
macro-level data. Though hardly an uncommon sin in the civil war literature, it is nevertheless a 
serious one. To prove the theory correct will require substantially different research methods, 
which this article begins to undertake below with a plausibility probe into a single case: this 
decade’s deadly counterinsurgency in western Sudan. 
Background 
The recent human tragedy in Darfur is a telling illustration of the preliminary theory proposed in 
Figure 2. In some sense this case is selected on both the dependent and the independent variable, 
because virtually every scholar and practitioner who has studied the current situation in Darfur 
agrees that the conflict has been motivated at least in part by land disputes.[48] However, the 
particular mechanism suggested here has yet to be illustrated in the limited academic literature 
on the conflict. Furthermore, as we shall see, there is a good deal more variation on both 





Figure 2: Preliminary theory of arable land scarcity-fueled civil war. 
Illustrative Case: Darfur 
This case illustration will seek to suggest that changes in arable land growth were a major, 
though not exclusive, cause of the unprecedented human tragedy in Darfur. To make this 
illustration I will demonstrate two facts. First, it makes sense temporally to claim that positive 
land supply growth acted as a fairly direct brake on the catastrophic conflict potential of the 
region, and that major conflict followed the removal of this brake in the late 1990s. (To make 
this claim more convincing, I show that land supply changes operated independently from 
several other potential causes of the violence, including demand-induced scarcity, structure-
induced scarcity and the general political conditions of western Sudan just prior to 2003.) 
Secondly, negative changes to land supply seem to have increased the recruiting efficacy of 
Government of Sudan (GoS) and Janjawiid elites through a temporal RD-fueled, micro-level 
mechanism. Thus these shocks acted as an indirect gas pedal; they happened to be mobilized 
successfully by elites, but might not have been. 
Before these specific claims are advanced, some general background follows. On the ground, the 
Darfur conflict has looked like the continuation of long-standing disputes between pastoralists, 
who are mostly Arab, and farmers, who are mostly African. The pastoralists need land for their 
camels, cattle and other animals to graze and the farmers need land for crops; herein lies the root 
of the disputes. Though violent conflict was surely not absent prior to 1970, during that time 




did away with the “Native Administration” put in place by the British colonists, and in 1971 
when the GoS’ Unregistered Lands Act declared all untitled land government property for them 
to distribute as they wished. Every account of Darfur’s troubled past mentions these two actions 
as the beginning of serious land conflict in western Sudan, because these central government 
actions effectively destroyed the prior institutional order. 
Conditions were worsened by a severe drought in the mid-1980s, which was accompanied by 
famine and low-level violent conflicts. An Arab-African clash of medium intensity (about 5,400 
deaths[49]) erupted between 1987 and 1989, and the terms of the peace agreement ending the 
conflict were never enforced. This clash was largely a proxy conflict between Libya (supporting 
the Arabs as part of Qaddafi’s irredentist vision) and Chad (supporting the Africans), although 
this element of the tension eased somewhat in 1991 as Qaddafi’s influence waned in western 
Sudan.[50] It was in this conflict that the so-called “Janjawiid” militants were first named—
Arabs, often on horseback, attacking villages, forcing out farmers and “laying claim to their 
land.”[51] 
As this conflict was winding down, Omar al-Bashir came to power in Khartoum. His Arab 
supremacist outlook spelled trouble for the Africans in the west. In 1994 the GoS divided the 
Darfur region into three states, which were gerrymandered to reduce African political influence. 
Nevertheless, the situation on the ground seems to have been fairly quiet throughout most of the 
1990s. That changed between 1997 and 1999, as local-level violent conflicts between pastoralists 
and farmers began to resurge.[52] Then, in 2000, an Arab supremacist general—Abdallah al-Safi 
al-Nur—became governor of the state of North Darfur. The governor promptly disbanded the 
non-Arab police and handed their weapons over to Musa Hilal. Hilal is a member of one of the 
pastoralist Arab tribes, and is considered the commander of the Janjawiid militias. In 2000 he 
was actively recruiting and training men for these militias, and by 2002 Janjawiid attacks on 
African villages had significantly intensified. 
The present conflict in Darfur mainly erupted on April 25, 2003, when anti-Khartoum rebels 
largely from the African tribes mounted a brazen attack on an airbase in the region. After initial 
efforts to suppress the rebellion using the regular army proved ineffective—due in large part to 
defections—Bashir authorized the rearming and additional recruitment of Janjawiid militants, in 
order to fight, as Alex De Waal has called it, a “counterinsurgency on the cheap.”[53] Thereafter 
chaos reigned, as Janjawiid swept through the villages, killing, raping and pillaging with 
impunity. According to the International Criminal Court, this wave of violence spiked in mid-
2003, hit a trough toward the end of that year, and then spiked again in early 2004. By mid-2004 
the killing had dropped to lower levels, where it has stayed up to the present.[54] By February 
2006 the estimated death toll stood at 200,000, in addition to 2.5 million refugees (in Chad) or 
internally displaced persons (in Sudan)—far surpassing any violence the troubled region had 





Supply Growth Acted Independently as a Direct Brake 
The greatest mystery about Darfur is why 2003? As the chronology indicates, conditions for a 
catastrophic substate conflict in western Sudan had been ripe since 1970—so what caused the 
outbreak of major violence in the early 2000s, not before or after? It is this puzzle that changes in 
the supply of arable land seem to explain. Figure 3 shows Sudan’s arable land supply and 
population between 1961 and 2005. The general story is: Arable land increased slowly through 
about 1992, and then rapidly through about 1996. Starting in 1997, land growth stagnated, and 
briefly went negative. This stagnation abated in 2003, when growth resumed. Meanwhile, 
population growth—though unhealthily high, with an annual rate of 5.2 percent—remained fairly 
steady throughout this period. The land GINI coefficient for Sudan (not shown) also held 
relatively steady, not deviating from 0.64 between 1980 and 1999. 
Thus the data imply that while the proxies demand for growth and structure stayed fairly 
constant, arable land supply hit a plateau in the years just prior to the onset of major violence in 
2003. This suggests that arable land growth in prior years—particularly the early- to mid-1990s, 
when, as noted in the case background, Darfur seems to have been fairly quiet—was acting as a 
direct brake on the conflict-prone situation, just as we saw in the large-N portion of this study. 
When that brake was removed, violence followed fairly soon after. 
 





Figure 4: Rainfall data for El Fasher, North Darfur (reproduced from Bromwich, “Environmental 
Degradation and Conflict in Darfur”). The points represent individual years; the line represents the ten-
year moving average. 
Since Sudan is Africa’s largest country, it would be ideal to see this story mirrored in Darfur 
itself. Not surprisingly, the sub-national data available for such comparisons are limited; 
nevertheless, the data available seem reasonably supportive of the observations made at the 
national level. Figure 4, taken from Brendan Bromwich’s (2008) article, shows annual rainfall in 
El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, between 1917 and 2007. There is a slow decline in the 
ten-year average between Sudanese independence (1956) and the mid-1980s—a decline not 
reflected in the national-level data discussed above. For the most part this decline was 
unaccompanied by major conflict; even the 1987 war saw only about one-fortieth of the deaths 
of the 2003 war. Thus these long, scarce years should likely be viewed as a case of temporal 
relative deprivation but mobilization failure; the causes of this failure merit further exploration. 
Thereafter average rainfall rises, hitting a peak in the mid-1990s. Next average rainfall declines, 
hitting another low in 2000. Though the ten-year average goes back up thereafter, the points 
representing 2001-2004 also show relatively poor rain years. Thus changes in rainfall in North 
Darfur correspond fairly closely to changes in arable land in late 1990s Sudan; in both cases, 
resource supply seems to have been backing off from a fairly peaceful growth period in the years 
just prior to the 2003 conflict. It is worth asking how well rainfall and arable land are actually 
correlated; based on the entire dataset their correlation is very low, as will be discussed in the 
conclusion (nor does rainfall have more explanatory power than arable land in the entire dataset, 




national-level data.[56] Other rough proxies for renewable resource supply in Darfur tell a similar 
story. A recent article using remote sensing to estimate vegetation “greenness” in Darfur also 
shows an improvement in ecological conditions in the early 1990s, followed by a drop-off in the 
late 1990s—though these data suggest another improvement in 1999 and the early 2000s 
(perhaps too late to stave off the temporal RD-related grievance already fomented).[57] 
Meanwhile, the growth of resource demand in Darfur seems not only to have not been 
increasing, but in fact decreasing. According to official census data (which admittedly is likely 
to undercount pastoralists), Darfur’s population grew rapidly between 1973 and 1983 (at an 
annualized rate of 16.1 percent) but more slowly between 1983 and 1993 (6 percent per year) 
and even more slowly between 1993 and 2003 (1.6 percent per year).[58] 
Also, based on a review of histories of late twentieth century Darfur, it seems unlikely that 
structure-induced scarcity or the general political-military climate of western Darfur worsened or 
improved much just prior to 2003. This is not to suggest that the structure of the region stayed 
completely constant in western Sudan during this time period, for there are plenty of individual 
instances of detrimental central or local government actions to cite.[59] At the same time, one 
does not get the sense that daily life was worsening in the late 1990s and early 2000s for the 
pastoralists, who came to form the core of the deadly counterinsurgency, except through the land 
supply mechanism. Analysts have pointed out that Darfur was awash in arms when the 2003 
conflict broke out, but this had been the case since Qaddafi’s irredentist adventures of the 
1980s—in 1990, it was estimated that there were “more than 50,000 modern small weapons 
available in Darfur.”[60] So if, as Julie Flint and De Waal claim, “the Kalashnikov transformed 
the moral order of Darfur,”[61] then that transformation happened some time ago. Furthermore, 
to the extent that sociopolitical changes were afoot in this time period—such as al-Nur’s 
accession in El Fasher—these changes were largely working in favor of the Arabs. 
Thus there is evidence, strongest at the national level but reasonably mirrored in Darfur itself, 
that a detrimental change in the growth of land supply closely preceded the 2003 violence, and 
that this change was independent of the demand, structural, and political-military context. The 
2003 war, then, seemingly was a case of temporal relative deprivation—brought on by removal 
of the direct supply-growth brake—combined with mobilization success. 
Supply Changes Help Explain Janjawiid Recruitment 
As supportive as these data are, one wonders if the individual participants in the deadly Janjawiid 
militias—“Khartoum’s main weapon against Darfurian [sic] rebels” despite supplemental air and 
regular army support[62]—were really motivated by negative arable land supply changes to 
undertake their actions. It will likely be many years before a scientific survey can be undertaken 
among the Janjawiid, but in the meantime, it does appear that the stagnated supply of land in the 




As with the violence itself, the puzzle of Janjawiid recruitment is to explain a sudden, sharp 
uptick. When al-Nur handed police weaponry over to Hilal in 2000, Hilal had recruited 2,000 
Janjawiid. By October 2002 this number had swelled to 5,000.[64] By “the height of the war” 
(2003 and 2004) the count was at 20,000.[65] So what caused militia membership to increase 
tenfold in less than four years? 
Though Janjawiid militiamen are diverse, ranging from common criminals to Chadian thrill-
seekers, the bulk of the new recruits in and around 2003 seem to have come from the camel-
herding pastoralist tribes of northern and western Darfur. Flint and De Waal give a sense of the 
scale, reporting that at one point in 2003 “6,000 volunteers raised by tribal leaders in West 
Darfur” arrived at an army post to be armed. (Some were non-Arabs and were turned away by 
the GoS.)[66] One tribal amalgamation in particular, the Northern Rizaygat (NR), has been a 
particularly prolific contributor; a focus group in Young et al.’s (2009) field study of the NR 
reported a post-2003 rise in military salary-drawers from 0 percent to 60 percent.[67] And Young 
et al.’s field study reveals additional information about the NR that supports the story told by the 
national and sub-national data. They write: 
The leadership of the Northern Rizaygat tribes … broadly supported the call [to arms by 
the GoS in 2003] and were quick to respond. … In North and West Darfur, many 
interviewees justified the rapid response of support for the government by the 
accumulation of grievances over the years by the Arab pastoralists against the Zaghawa 
in the north (who continually raided Arab camel herds) and also against the Masalit, 
particularly in terms of blocking of migration and fencing of pastures. … These fears [of 
further antagonism] were a result of a long history of tribal tensions and conflict, and 
those [NR] interviewed remember well a catalogue of incidents and killings, which, in 
West Darfur, date back to 1997.[68] 
Of note here is that the local-level antagonism of the NR by the African tribes seems to have 
begun around the same time that rainfall in Darfur (and arable land growth in Sudan writ large) 
began to taper off. Robert Collins tells a similar story in North Darfur, where Masalit started 
anti-Islamist guerilla warfare in 1998 after a different group of pastoralist tribes “began to move 
south much earlier than usual with their herds and flocks, which frequently trampled the crops of 
Masalit farmers.”[69] Since stagnated arable land growth likely spurred temporal relative 
deprivation among the farmers, it makes sense that they would resort to more antagonistic 
measures to secure resources, such as fencing pastoral land and retaliating against crop 
trampling.[70] Thus it is reasonable to suppose that in several parts of Darfur, stagnating arable 
land supply incited low-level, temporal RD-driven farmer-pastoralist conflict, which created 
anger and fear among the pastoralists—a pool of grievance—that GoS and Janjawiid leaders 
were able to transform into a surge in recruitment. If these emotions existed in 1987, they were 
not as successfully transformed. 
This is not the orthodox narrative of Janjawiid recruitment, which prefers to place the blame for 




Waal point out: “Without friends in high places in the capital, Musa Hilal’s recruitment and 
training center … could not have expanded as it did after … 1996.”[71] This narrative should not 
be dismissed, not least because it implies criminal responsibility for Bashir but also because 
there are numerous anecdotal accounts of the rapid uptick in the Janjawiid’s capabilities after 
Khartoum’s decision to employ “counterinsurgency on the cheap.”[72] Indeed, on the surface it 
might make sense simply to assert that the April 2003 airbase attack “transformed Darfur’s war 
from provincial discontent into a front-rank military danger to Khartoum,”[73] and that the 
number of deaths beginning in 2003 is simply a function of the extent to which the GoS was 
paying attention to the region. 
The preliminary theory proposed in Figure 2 helps sort out these competing stories—it suggests, 
in essence, that they are both right but that neither explains everything. The necessary but 
insufficient pool of grievance, which seems to have spurred individual pastoralists to join the 
Janjawiid, appears best attributed to local-level land conflicts brought on by negative supply 
shocks in the late 1990s. The necessary and sufficient successful exploitation of these grievances 
is probably due at least in part to Khartoum’s more direct involvement in Janjawiid recruitment 
after April 25, 2003. Hence we have both a “climate culprit” (in the words of UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki Moon)[74] and a “Khartoum culprit.”[75] 
Therefore, both data and narrative support the supposition that a drop in the arable land growth 
rate in the late 1990s and early 2000s created temporal relative deprivation, which in turn incited 
local land conflicts, which formed a pool of grievance that tribal, Janjawiid and GoS elites 
successfully exploited. The resultant surge in Janjawiid manpower led to the worst armed 
conflict ever seen in western Sudan—indeed, the worst manmade humanitarian disaster on Earth 
in the first decade of the 21st century. Thus we see tendencies identified in the large-N section—
mainly, arable land supply change as a direct brake but indirect gas pedal on conflict—borne out 
in this case. 
Conclusion 
This article is part of a recent surge of interest in the security consequences of climate change, 
focused specifically on whether climate change should be expected to lead to an increase in the 
frequency of armed substate conflict. Unlike most recent work on this issue, however, the article 
has focused in on one link in the climate change to conflict causal chain—the relationship 
between arable land scarcity and conflict (see Figure 1). And unlike most of the work on the 
land-conflict link specifically, this work has made use of a dynamic explanatory variable that 
captures changes in arable land supply over time rather than at a single time-point. The result has 
been a rigorous, intuitive, and theoretically consistent engagement with the question of whether 
great power security policymakers should worry about climate change’s repercussions for 
substate conflict in the world. 
The short answer is yes. A robust and statistically significant negative association between arable 




change’s postulated negative effect on future arable land growth should lead to an increased 
likelihood of civil war in the coming decades—particularly in Africa and Latin America, where 
arable land stocks are expected to be affected most significantly. But the short answer is not the 
whole answer. The preliminary theory presented in this article, which was formulated to explain 
the curious discontinuity between the effects of positive “delta-land” and negative “delta-land,” 
casts negative arable land growth as a necessary but insufficient condition for civil war along the 
arable land scarcity causal pathway. As appears to have been the case in Darfur, local and 
individual grievances appear to be in relatively short supply as long as arable land endowment 
grows. Once that growth slows or is reversed, local-level grievances significantly increase due to 
the temporal relative deprivation incurred. These grievances may then be parlayed by elites into 
insurgency or counterinsurgency support, or there may be no such mobilization success. 
Mobilization is hard, and as a result, we should not expect to see an unstoppable wave of climate 
change-related conflicts in the coming decades—a trickle seems more likely. 
Nevertheless, the severity of the Darfur conflict suggests that it would be worth policymakers’ 
energy to keep this trickle as intermittent as possible, by predicting the sites of future scarcity-
related conflicts and making an effort—through development or security assistance—to prevent 
them from breaking out. Predictive work of this kind is theoretically possible, but will require 
substantial additional research into the causes of scarcity-driven substate conflicts.  
Foremost among future research requirements is the need to prove and generalize the preliminary 
theory proposed here. Ultimately, proving an individual-level theory (rather than just suggesting 
one) involves talking to individuals. Thus, a valuable extension of this inquiry would be survey 
research in countries, which experienced a period of arable land growth, followed by a sudden 
plateau (or cliff) in that trajectory. One could imagine a study structured quite similarly to the 
large-N work here: asking ex-combatants, those in war-afflicted countries who decided not to 
fight, and similar people in most-likely but non-war-afflicted countries, the role that arable land 
supply change, population pressure, distribution of arable land, changes in their income, and so 
forth played in their decisions to fight or not to fight. One contribution of the current article is 
that it has yielded a vast set of potential such conflicts and non-conflicts to study; these country-
years can now be described with a continuous and highly variable measure of land supply change 
rather than the largely ordinal measures used in the past. 
It would be also worthwhile to consider arable land supply change as a dependent variable. There 
are countless potential causes of such supply changes, and environmental degradation is just one 
subset of them. In fact, Table 5 shows that changes in annual rainfall (also from t-4 to t-1) were 
not well correlated with delta-land globally between 1965 and 1999, making Sudan the exception 
not the rule.[76] (Adding a delta-rainfall variable to the models above generally does not yield a 
significant coefficient on delta-rainfall, nor does it substantially reduce the significance of delta-
land.) Though the IPCC seemingly expects these two variables to be correlated in the future, it 





Table 5: Fixed-Effects OLS Models (DV = Delta-Land) 











































































































N 2649 2798 4199 752 1318 
R2 (within) 0.0130 0.0149 0.0067 0.0923 0.0379 
Two-tailed tests; absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. Clustering standard errors by country is not 
necessary for these models, but robust standard errors are still used. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The data collected in this article tell us little with respect to this question; we see agricultural 
import growth negatively correlated with arable land growth, which makes little intuitive sense, 
and weak positive coefficients on urban population growth and land GINI. More broadly, the 
environmental science literature appears not to have reached a satisfactory consensus on the 
causes of delta-land, whether social or environmental.[77] This indeterminacy raises the specter 
of omitted variable bias for the results presented in this article, although it is difficult to conceive 
of a sociopolitical phenomenon causing both arable land supply change and civil war that is not 
already accounted for in the models above. More to the point, it highlights the fact that more 
work needs to be done in both the social and natural sciences on the factors driving arable land 
supply change. It also raises the question of whether environmentally-caused supply changes are 
more or less conflict-prone than changes arising from other sources. Now that the first link in the 
climate change to conflict casual chain (see Figure 1) has been suggested as valid by both large-
N analysis and an examination of the Darfur tragedy, work on these questions is even more 
necessary. 
These two research directions alone are vast, and there are potentially many more— for instance, 
what have states that have faced sudden shocks to arable land supply growth done about it; what 




territory, further explorations of the arable land-conflict relationship, as well as the resource 
scarcity-conflict relationship more generally, seem suited for a central place on the civil war 
research agenda. 
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45. Although this article favors a grievance story based on the Darfur case study (below), one 
could tell a greed story that ends similarly. Shrinking arable land supply threatens livelihoods; it 
could reduce individuals’ opportunity costs for violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and thereby 
render them more likely to join insurgencies or counterinsurgencies. 
46. In this article, “necessary” and “sufficient” are used with reference only to the causal 
pathway proposed here. It is possible, then, for civil war to break out when the “necessary” 
condition of temporal RD has not been met, because another causal pathway not discussed here 
might be dominant. Thus “necessary” and “sufficient” as used here can also be thought of as 
shorthand for “background condition, without which civil war is highly unlikely” and “proximate 
condition, which is highly likely to be correlated with civil war outbreak.” Kahl (2006, 58-59) 
comes to a similar conclusion about his “demographic and environmental stress” variable. 
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discussed above, the data on permanent pasture are too unreliable to use in this article. For 
instance, both the GoS and the FAO report the exact same quantity of permanent pasture (117.18 
million hectares) in Sudan between 1999 and 2005, which seems implausible given what we 
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71. Flint and De Waal 2008, 38. 
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Appendix: Summary Statistics and DV-IV Scattergram 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Percent Land Degraded 5040 36.23452 30.89065 0 100 
Delta-Land (percent) 4410 1.990645 8.537548 -51.49351 100 
Land per capita 
(hectares) 
4990 .3541218 .3861697 .0002526 3.647891 
Delta-Population 
(percent) 
4792 6.377184 6.714631 -57.43896 117.0544 
Land GINI 
(coefficient) 
3395 .6335118 .1646593 .2274741 .9797344 
Delta-Imports (percent) 4349 24.32307 209.2319 -99.37708 10447.37 
POLITY 2 (score) 5399 -.5067605 7.536763 -10 10 
Average POLITY 
(score) 
4395 -.5934016 7.437818 -10 10 
GDP per capita 
(thousands of dollars) 
5262 4.003274 4.805031 .133 66.735 
Delta-GDP per capita 
(percent) 








5436 .3763336 .2195643 0 .7828 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(dummy) 
5436 .2831126 .4505521 0 1 
Male Secondary 
Education (index) 
4547 42.42303 30.39131 1 147 
Percent Mountainous 
Terrain 
5436 17.50109 21.08829 0 94.3 
Political Instability 
(dummy) 
5429 .1445938 .3517233 0 1 
Cold War (dummy) 5436 .7178072 .4501081 0 1 
Peace Years 5402 24.97316 16.35579 0 53 
Percent Urban 
Population 




4411 1.530329 2.300428 -6.96 73.18 
Delta-Rainfall 
(percent) 
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